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ABSTRACT 
 
 Using a 1977 article by Robert Clark as the starting point, this article attempts to shed new 
light on the question of whether and when shareholder loans to her company should be either 
equitably subordinated or, as courts have done in a few recent cases, recharacterized as 
equity.  In its emphasis on the particular issue of shareholder loans, the article has a narrower 
compass than Clark’s article, which uses a four-part typology to explore the relationship 
among fraudulent conveyance law, equitable subordination, veil piercing and dividend 
restrictions.  But the article also expands Clark’s analysis in several respects.   The most 
important adjustment involves the general Nonhindrance ideal, which we use to identify a 
crucially important form of interference with the rights of creditors that Clark does not 
himself consider directly. 
 Part 1 of the article very briefly describes the 1939 Supreme Court case that served as a 
well-spring for equitable subordination doctrine in general, and for subordination of 
shareholder loans in particular.  Part 2 then focuses on a series of recent decisions that have 
wrestled with the question whether shareholder loans should be recharacterized as equity 
contributions.  Recharacterization doctrine is closely related to equitable subordination, but 
most courts view it as a separate development.  Part 2 suggests that much of the confusion in 
the cases could be eliminated by disentangling two issues, whether the status of a loan is 
ambiguous (which raises issues of Truth, in terms of Clark’s typology) and whether it was 
likely to destroy value that would otherwise go to creditors (the Nonhindrance concern); and 
by distinguishing bankruptcy recharacterization from the tax characterization cases that seem 
to have spawned the new doctrine.  Part 3 then concludes by briefly considering the German 
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and Austrian approaches to these same issues, which focus on capitalization and 
creditworthiness. 
 The most important, and initially counterintuitive, implication comes in Part 2: whereas 
US courts have treated security interests as a badge of legitimacy in assessing shareholder 
loans, secured loans are actually the most worrisome form of shareholder investment.  These 
security interests, we argue, should be disallowed.  
 
 
 
Keywords: corporations, corporate reorganization, fraudulent conveyance, 
recharacterization, bankruptcy, secured debt, shareholder loans, priority. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When a company fails, the judicial autopsy that ensues often reveals that its shareholders 
were far more than shareholders alone. Particularly when there is a controlling shareholder or 
the company is enmeshed in a parent-subsidiary framework, one or more shareholders may 
have made loans to the company, or supplied goods on credit, or leased property. Other 
shareholders, creditors who are not sure they will be repaid, and the courts to whom these 
shareholders or creditors take their complaints have long worried that the transactions are not 
entirely on the up-and-up. Since the controlling shareholder stands on both sides of the 
transaction, there is always a risk that she will charge too much for the goods she supplies, 
make dubious loans, or simply siphon assets out of the corporation. 
 Over the years, a wide variety of doctrines have been invoked, and new doctrines created, 
by US courts and legislatures to address the threat of insider manipulation. Under veil-
piercing doctrine, creditors can ask a court to hold shareholders personally liable for 
obligations of the company. Equitable subordination can be used to lower the priority status 
of an obligation owed to an insider or other creditor. If the company has overpaid for benefits 
provided by the insider, creditors can challenge the transaction under fraudulent conveyance 
law. And so on. 
 Long ago, before his illustrious career as dean of the Harvard Law School, Robert Clark 
wrote a seminal article arguing that many of the doctrines just mentioned can be understood 
as fitting a single, coherent pattern.1 The Ur-doctrine, the doctrine from which the others 
flow, he argued, is fraudulent conveyance law.2 Broadly understood, the argument continued, 
fraudulent conveyance law is designed to assure that a debtor honors four related moral 
obligations in its dealings with creditors. The first is Truth, which forbids the debtor from 
                                                 
1  R.C. Clark, ‘The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors’, 90 Harvard Law Review (1977) 
p. 505. Portions of the article appear in slightly revised form in a treatise Clark published a decade 
later: R.C. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston, Little, Brown 1986) pp. 52-72. 
2  Most States have adopted some form of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Although these provisions are incorporated into bankruptcy pursuant 
to 11 USC §544(b) (permitting creditors to invoke nonbankruptcy causes of action), the 
Bankruptcy Code also includes its own, very similar fraudulent conveyance provision. 11 USC 
§548. These provisions permit a debtor’s creditors to challenge, among other things, transfers for 
which the debtor did not receive adequate consideration if the debtor was at or near insolvency 
when the transfer occurred (constructive fraud) and transfers that were designed to hinder, delay, 
or defraud creditors (actual fraud). 
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lying to his creditors either by filing deceptive financing statements or in other ways.3 The 
second, Respect, prohibits the debtor from simply giving away money that might be used to 
repay creditors.4 Evenhandedness means he cannot pay some creditors rather than others. 
Finally, under Nonhindrance, which Clark views as a general category that subsumes the 
other three, the debtor is not permitted to take actions that are designed to stymie his 
creditors, such as converting liquid assets to illiquid ones to make it harder for creditors to 
collect. 
 Each of these ideals, according to Clark, is embodied in traditional fraudulent conveyance 
law. Other, seemingly separate doctrines are best seen as adjustments made through the years 
to fill in the gaps of the basic fraudulent conveyance framework. The biggest gap stems from 
the requirement in fraudulent conveyance law that creditors must point to a particular 
transaction or transactions that violate the debtor’s obligations to its creditors. If the debtor 
has engaged in numerous transactions over time, it may be difficult or impossible to prove on 
a transaction-by-transaction basis that the debtor has made fraudulent conveyances. Both 
equitable subordination and veil piercing plug this gap by substituting a “gestalt” approach 
for the transaction-specific requirements of fraudulent conveyance law.5 
 Using Clark’s article as the starting point, this article attempts to shed new light on the 
question of whether and when shareholder loans to her company should be either equitably 
subordinated or, as courts have done in a few recent cases, recharacterized as equity. In its 
emphasis on the particular issue of shareholder loans, the article has a narrower compass than 
its classic predecessor. But it also expands Clark’s analysis in several respects. The most 
important adjustment involves the Nonhindrance ideal, which we use to explore a crucially 
important form of interference with the rights of creditors that Clark does not himself 
consider directly.6 
 The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 very briefly describes the 1939 Supreme Court case 
that served as a well-spring for equitable subordination doctrine in general, and for 
subordination of shareholder loans in particular. Part 3 then focuses on a series of recent 
decisions that have wrestled with the question whether shareholder loans should be 
recharacterized as equity contributions. Recharacterization doctrine is closely related to 
equitable subordination, but most courts view it as a separate development. Part 3 suggests 
that much of the confusion in the cases could be eliminated by disentangling two issues: 
whether the status of a loan is ambiguous (which raises issues of Truth, in terms of Clark’s 
typology) and whether it was likely to destroy value that would otherwise go to creditors (the 
Nonhindrance concern); and by distinguishing bankruptcy recharacterization from the tax 
characterization cases that seem to have spawned the new doctrine. Part 4 then concludes by 
briefly considering the German and Austrian approaches to these same issues, which focus on 
capitalization and creditworthiness. 
 The most important, and initially counterintuitive, implication comes in Part 3: whereas 
US courts have treated security interests as a badge of legitimacy in assessing shareholder 
loans, secured loans are actually the most worrisome form of shareholder investment. These 
security interests, we argue, should be disallowed. 
                                                 
3  The ideal of Truth is described in Clark, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 509. The other three ideals are described 
at pp. 509-513. 
4  Clark later relabeled this attribute, calling it “Primacy.” Clark, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 53. 
5  Under equitable subordination doctrine, which is now codified in 11 USC §510, a court can 
subordinate the claim or interest of a creditor or shareholder who has acted inequitably. When a 
court pierces the corporate veil, it holds shareholders or affiliated entities liable for the obligations 
of a corporation. See, e.g., Clark, op. cit. n. 1, at pp. 71-85 (analyzing veil-piercing doctrine). 
6  It should go without saying that Clark himself may not agree with our appropriation of his four-
part typology. Whether he would view our analysis as an adaptation or a distortion, we cannot say. 
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2. In the beginning: Deep Rock and its legacy 
 
The subordination of shareholder loans in the United States dates back to a famous 1939 case 
that has long been viewed as an object lesson of the potential abuses of a parent-subsidiary 
framework. It is useful to describe the case in some detail in order to understand where 
equitable subordination came from and how far it has developed in the ensuing decades. 
 In Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric,7 generally known as the Deep Rock case for reasons 
that will soon become clear, Standard Gas & Electric Company, the parent corporation, 
acquired control of an oil company whose name it changed to Deep Rock Oil Corporation 
from its owner, C.B. Shaffer, in 1919. Shaffer initially shared voting control with Standard, 
but within two years Standard lost confidence in Shaffer, bought back his stock and pushed 
him out. Over the next decade, during which Deep Rock was invariably only “‘two jumps 
ahead of the wolf,’” as a Standard officer later testified, Standard ran an open account 
consisting of thousands of transactions between itself and Deep Rock.8 By the time the wolf 
finally caught up with Deep Rock in 1933, Deep Rock’s debt to Standard included 
$31,804,145.04 for cash contributions by Standard, $1,219,034.83 for management and 
supervision fees, $4,819,222.07 in interest charges, and $4,525,000 for leasing oil properties 
owned by another Standard subsidiary. These and other debits totaled over $52,000,000. 
After deducting credits of roughly $43,000,000, Standard filed a claim for $9,342,642.37 in 
Deep Rock’s bankruptcy. 
 Both the bankruptcy trustee and two preferred stockholders objected to Standard’s claim. 
“Many transactions entered in the account were attacked as fraudulent,” as the Supreme 
Court later put it, “and it was asserted that as Standard had made Deep Rock its mere agent or 
instrumentality it could not transmute itself from the status of proprietor of Deep Rock’s 
business to that of creditor.”9 The Court was persuaded that Standard’s behavior over the 
decade it controlled Deep Rock substantiated these complaints. From the beginning, Justice 
Reed wrote, “Deep Rock was insufficiently capitalized, was top heavy with debt and was in 
parlous financial condition. Standard so managed its affairs as always to have a stranglehold 
upon it.” Despite its precarious finances, Deep Rock paid over $3 million in dividends 
between 1926 and 1929, largely financed by borrowing from Standard. 
 Under traditional fraud conveyance law, the plaintiffs would have been forced to identify 
each of the improper transactions they intended to challenge, and indeed it appears that they 
attempted to do just this. Giving the difficulty of documenting the flurry of exchanges, 
however, many of the transactions might have slipped through the cracks. The Supreme 
Court did not let this difficulty stand in the way of recovery. Based on the “equitable 
principle that the doctrine of the corporate entity, recognized generally and for most 
purposes, will not be regarded when so to do would work fraud or injustice,” the Court 
reversed the lower courts’ approval of a reorganization plan that would have fully honored 
much of Standard’s claim. “No plan ought to be approved,” the Court held, “which does not 
accord the preferred stockholders a right of participation in the equity in the Company’s 
assets prior to that of Standard, and at least equal voice with Standard in the management. 
                                                 
7  Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric, 306 US 307 (1939). Taylor was decided the same year as 
another important decision subordinating a shareholder’s claim, Pepper v. Litton, 308 US 295 
(1939). These two cases are generally viewed as the fount of equitable subordination doctrine in 
the United States. 
8  Ibid., at p. 310. 
9  Ibid., at p. 312. 
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Anything less would be to remand them to precisely the status which has inflicted serious 
detriment on them in the past.”10 
 Deep Rock has laid the groundwork for decades of decisions wrestling with the question 
whether a shareholder loan or other claim should be subordinated.11 From time to time, courts 
and commentators have argued that subordination doctrine should be converted into a per se 
rule when the transactions in question involve a controlling shareholder or other insider. 
Judge Jerome Frank took this position in a series of cases starting in the late 1940s, arguing 
that the risk of manipulation by a controlling shareholder is so high that automatic 
subordination is justified, but he gave up this quest a few years later.12 In 1978, Congress 
codified equitable subordination as part of a sweeping reform of the American bankruptcy 
laws, quietly dropping a provision in the original proposal that would have provided for 
automatic subordination of insider claims. As it turns out, this codification has helped to 
spawn a new set of questions about the proper treatment of shareholder loans. 
 
3. Recharacterization: to praise or bury insider loans 
 
In recent years, the Deep Rock concern with obligations to a controlling shareholder has 
spawned a new doctrine that is closely linked to, yet at times subtly different from, equitable 
subordination. In these cases, the bankruptcy court is asked to recharacterize debt owed to an 
insider-shareholder, and to treat it as equity rather than debt. Recharacterization is said to 
differ from ordinary subordination in two respects: it does not require a showing that the 
shareholder acted inequitably; and rather than simply being subordinated to other creditor 
claims, the shareholder’s contribution is treated as equity.13 
 Courts have wrestled with recharacterization both on doctrinal grounds and as a matter of 
policy. Some have concluded that bankruptcy courts do not have the authority to treat debt as 
if it were equity. In other cases, including many of the most recent decisions, courts have 
concluded that they have the power to conduct this reverse alchemy, but they seem uncertain 
how to determine when debt should be recharacterized. A useful gauge of the uncertainty is 
the steady proliferation of factors courts try to take into account. After surveying the previous 
case law, the leading case compiled a list of eleven factors;14 a subsequent case concluded 
that eleven was not enough, and added two more.15 
 This part begins by describing the recharacterization case law and arguing that much of the 
doctrinal uncertainty stems from the fact that several different kinds of issues are subsumed 
under the label “recharacterization.” The doctrine has been further confused by courts’ 
                                                 
10  Ibid., at p. 324. 
11  In determining whether to equitably subordinate a claim or interest, either of a shareholder or of an 
ordinary creditor, courts tend to require (1) inequitable conduct; (2) injury to creditors or an unfair 
benefit to the challenged claimant; and (3) that subordination not conflict with other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The inquiry is derived from Matter of Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692 (5th 
Cir. 1977), which was decided shortly before equitable subordination was incorporated into the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code. 
12  These cases, and Judge Frank’s sympathy for a rule of automatic subordination, are described in 
Clark, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 537, n. 89. 
13  See, e.g., J.H.M. Sprayregen, J.P. Friedland, J.A.J. Brighton, and S.F. Bianca, ‘Recharacterization 
of Debt to Equity: An Overview, Update, and Practical Guide to an Evolving Doctrine’, Annual 
Survey of Bankruptcy Law (2004) p. 1 at p. 4. 
14  In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2001). The eleven factors are listed and 
critiqued in section 3.4 infra. 
15  In re Outboard Marine Corp., 2003 WL 21697357 1, 5 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (adding “(12) the ratio of 
shareholder loans to capital and (13) the amount or degree of shareholder control”). 
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reliance on an older, superficially similar body of tax recharacterization case law. After 
disentangling the issues, we explore them in more detail in the second and third sections, and 
offer a proposed solution to the treatment of shareholder loans. The final section then revisits 
the multi-factor test that has emerged in the case law. 
 
 
3.1 Recharacterization: disentangling the concerns 
 
As part of a proposed bankruptcy reform that became the starting point for the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed that equitable 
subordination be codified after forty years of development in the courts in the wake of the 
Deep Rock and Pepper v. Litton cases. Under the provision drafted by the Commission, the 
claims of insiders would have been automatically subordinated, and the bankruptcy court 
would have had discretion to subordinate other claims as circumstances warranted.16 The 
automatic subordination provision (a concept we will revisit below) disappeared with little 
fanfare, but discretionary subordination remained in the legislation that was eventually 
enacted. It is the terms of this codification, as it turns out, that have raised questions about 
bankruptcy courts’ authority to recharacterize debt as equity. 
 The provision itself is quite simple. “[A]fter notice and a hearing,” it reads, “the court may 
… under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or 
part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed 
interest to all or part of another allowed interest.”17 The dilemma, in the view of some courts, 
is that this provision instructs courts to look to “principles of equitable subordination” as the 
basis for subordinating a claim. Yet the case law on recharacterization does not seem to rely 
on principles of equitable subordination at all. In most of the recharacterization cases, a 
shareholder or other insider supplies cash to a struggling company in the form of a loan. In 
some of the cases, the loan is poorly documented (or not documented at all) and the 
shareholder does not insist on regular payments. The question courts have often asked, as 
summarized by a group of prominent bankruptcy lawyers, is “whether the transaction bears 
the characteristics of an arm’s length bargain.”18 In the equitable subordination context, by 
contrast, the principal issue – and thus a key principle – is whether the shareholder or creditor 
has engaged in inequitable conduct. In effect, then, recharacterization seems to achieve the 
effect of equitable subordination without requiring any showing of inequitable conduct. The 
cases that have questioned their own authority to recharacterize a loan have pointed to this 
tension between the recharacterization remedy and the language of the equitable 
subordination provision. “Where there is a specific provision governing these 
determinations,” the most prominent of the cases concluded, “it is inconsistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code to allow such determinations to be made under different standards through 
the use of a court’s equitable powers.”19 
 Courts that conclude they have the authority to recharacterize have gently accused their 
more diffident peers of making a category mistake. Recharacterization and equitable 
subordination, they argue, are entirely different remedies. “The effect of a bankruptcy court’s 
recharacterization of a claim from debt to equity may be similar to the court’s subordination 
of a claim through equitable subordination,” as the Sixth Circuit put it, “but there are 
                                                 
16  Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. DOC. 93-137, Part 
II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1973). 
17  11 USC §510(c)(1). 
18  Sprayregen, et al., loc. cit. n. 13, at p. 12. 
19  In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 Bankr. 112 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) at p. 115. 
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important differences between a court’s analysis of recharacterization and equitable 
subordination issues. Not only do recharacterization and equitable subordination serve 
different functions, but the extent to which a claim is subordinated under each process may be 
different.”20 The question in a recharacterization case “is whether a debt actually exists.”21 
With equitable subordination, by contrast, the validity of the debt obligation is not in 
question. The issue is “whether a legitimate creditor engaged in inequitable conduct;” if so, 
the principal remedy is to subordinate the creditor’s claim to the claims of other creditors, not 
to treat the claim as equity. 
 There is an intuitive logic to the argument that recharacterization is simply a different 
creature than equitable subordination, and it seems to be prevailing in the case law. Nearly all 
of the most recent cases have concluded that courts do indeed have the power to 
recharacterize. But the line between equitable subordination and recharacterization is not 
quite so pristine as the cases suggest. Inequitable behavior is not a prerequisite for 
recharacterization – in theory, the question is simply: was the shareholder’s capital infusion a 
loan or a contribution to capital? – yet courts’ sense of the propriety of the shareholder’s 
behavior seems to influence their decision whether to recharacterize.22 The question whether 
the company was adequately capitalized at its inception also seems to figure prominently in 
both contexts. And courts – Deep Rock itself is a prime example – do not always assume that 
the obligations they subordinate in the equitable subordination context are legitimate 
claims.23 
 If this tendency to draw overly sharp distinctions between recharacterization and equitable 
subordination only affected courts’ determination whether they have authority to 
recharacterize claims, it would be relatively unproblematic. Although courts have 
exaggerated the differences, the reasoning would go, their basic conclusion that 
recharacterization is not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code is sound. But the effect is not as 
simple as this. The effort to identify an analytically distinct doctrinal foundation for 
recharacterization seems to have caused courts to confuse two different issues that arise when 
shareholders pump cash into a troubled enterprise. The first problem is shareholder 
contributions that are ambiguous in form. Although structured as loans, the contributions 
sometimes are not treated like ordinary loans; they may lack documentation or be repaid 
more erratically than other loans. Second is the question whether and on what terms loans 
from an insider should be encouraged when a business has encountered financial distress. 
Courts’ reliance on tax recharacterization doctrine has further confused the analysis. 
Disentangling these considerations may help us to develop a new perspective on the 
recharacterization cases. 
 
3.2 The ambiguous loan problem 
 
                                                 
20  In re AutoStyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at p. 748 [emphasis in original]. 
21  In statutory terms, a “creditor” is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor,” 11 USC §101(10) 
and a “claim” is a “right to payment.” 11 USC §101(5). The question is whether the shareholder is 
a creditor who has made a loan and thus has a claim, or whether the contribution is simply an 
“interest.” 
22  In In re Micro-Precision Technologies, Inc., 303 Bankr. 238 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2003) at p. 247, for 
instance, the Court described the recharacterization doctrine as applying to claims by corporate 
insiders and those who have dealt with the debtor in a potentially inequitable fashion. 
23  As evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court did not simply subordinate the controlling 
shareholder’s claim; it also insisted that control of the reorganized company needed to be shared 
with the company’s preferred stockholders. 
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A natural inclination of the principal shareholders of a floundering business is to look in their 
own pockets (and often the pockets of friends and relatives) for cash to plug the leaks. They 
see the problems first, and they may conclude that arranging an outside loan would be too 
time-consuming and uncertain. Better that those who know the business best provide the 
funding themselves. 
 The problem is that, while these cash infusions from insiders are usually described as 
loans, they sometimes are not treated like ordinary loans. There may not be any formal loan 
agreement, for instance, or the documentation that exists may omit key terms like the interest 
rate or repayment schedule. In one recent case, four of the five promissory notes called for in 
a purported secured lending transaction were never drafted, and the original loan was never 
properly perfected. The imaginary notes were subsequently assigned to another entity (which, 
like the first, was controlled by shareholders of the debtor) but no assignment document was 
ever executed.24 In other, less egregious cases, no payments are made at all between the time 
of the capital infusion and the time the company files for bankruptcy. The absence of any 
payments to the shareholder is not necessarily inconsistent with the contribution being a loan 
– after all, demand loans have precisely this quality – but this makes it look as though the 
insider is trying to treat the contribution as a loan if the company performs either very well 
(and thus can repay it) or very poorly (winding up in bankruptcy), while treating it as a 
contribution to equity while the company’s finances remain in a precarious state. 
 In Clark’s terms, the key issue here is whether the ambiguous loan violates the debtor’s 
obligation of Truth. These loans do not interfere with the expectation of Respect, since the 
shareholder is not giving the company’s money away; and Evenhandedness is not at issue. 
The problem is that a shareholder’s ambiguous loan may create a obligation that other 
creditors do not even know exists. A supplier who checks Dun & Bradstreet or another credit 
reporting service to assess the company’s overall debt situation may not see any reference to 
the shareholder’s purported loan. The misleading picture of the company’s finances could, 
among other things, cause the supplier to provide credit it otherwise would have withheld. 
 Since the principal issue with an ambiguous loan is one of Truth, this objective should 
guide the initial decision whether it is treated as debt or equity. If there is little or no 
documentation, or there is other evidence that the company’s creditors were or might have 
been misled about the existence of the claimed loan, recharacterization may be appropriate. 
The fact that a loan is clearly documented or shows up in the company’s credit reports, by 
contrast, would weigh strongly in favor of treating the cash infusion as a loan. 
 Notice that the focus is quite different from the tax law jurisprudence on recharacterizing 
debt as equity.25 The tax cases are most worried about low priority obligations that function 
like a class of stock but are treated like debt in order to give a shareholder the tax benefits of 
debt. Convertibility is worrisome from a tax perspective, since debt that can be converted into 
voting stock enables the company to treat the interest payments on the debt as a (deductible) 
business expense, while giving the security holder the option of converting to stock for the 
purposes of voting control. Convertibility has not been at issue in the bankruptcy 
                                                 
24  Bunch v. J.M. Capital Fin. Ltd (In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc.), 327 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. D. Ark. 
2005). The Court had no difficulty finding that recharacterization was appropriate on these facts. 
“This simply is not debt,” the Court concluded. “The purpose of the JM Capital transaction was 
not to incur debt necessary to the debtor’s operations; its purpose was to pay interest on equity and 
to judgment-proof the debtor.” Ibid., at pp. 410-411. 
25  The classic analysis of Internal Revenue Service doctrine on whether a security should be treated 
as debt or equity for tax purposes is W.T. Plumb, Jr., ‘The Federal Income Tax Significance of 
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal’, 26 Tax Law Review (1971) p. 369. For a brief 
overview of tax recharacterization doctrine, see D.A. Skeel, Jr., ‘Markets, Courts and the Brave 
New World of Bankruptcy Theory’, Wisconsin Law Review (1993) p. 465 at p. 501. 
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recharacterization cases, and, even if it were, the existence of a right to convert would tell us 
little about whether the initial characterization as debt should be honored. Similarly, and 
more importantly, if the contribution is structured as a traditional secured loan, it poses no 
problems from a tax perspective. But secured shareholder loans are quite worrisome in the 
bankruptcy context, for reasons discussed in detail in the next section. 
 Where the status of a loan is ambiguous, courts would do well to focus directly on the real 
problem with this ambiguity – the danger that other creditors will be misled. The ideal in 
question is Truth, and the concern is that sloppiness or deception by the shareholder will 
interfere with collection by creditors of their claims. 
 
3.3 Ill-founded loans that hinder other creditors 
 
The second, more subtle, issue is whether shareholder contributions to a faltering enterprise 
may interfere with creditors’ collection of their claims even if there is no sloppiness or 
deception whatsoever.26 The ideal in question here is not Truth so much as a more general 
concern, as Clark puts it, “of Nonhindrance of the enforcement of valid legal obligations 
against oneself, in connection with transfers of one’s property.”27 Clark illustrates the ideal of 
Nonhindrance by imagining a debtor who sells readily marketable stock for illiquid assets in 
order to make it difficult for her creditors to collect the amounts they are owed. A shareholder 
loan seems quite different from loading up on illiquid assets – indeed our initial inclination is 
often to applaud the shareholder loan – but the effect may often be quite similar. 
 To appreciate how a shareholder loan can hinder the company’s creditors, even when it is 
done in the light of day, consider a company that owes its creditors a total of $100, and whose 
assets are worth a total of $80. If the principal shareholder contributes $10 in cash to the 
company, the cash can be used to pursue a project that has a 50 percent probability of being 
worth $15 after a year’s time, and a 50 percent probability of being worth $0. Because the 
project has a net value of negative $2.50 ($7.50 expected value minus $10 cost), pursuing it 
will reduce the recovery available to the company’s creditors. Yet if the shareholder 
structures her contribution so that she is promised, say, $15 in a year’s time on the principal 
and accrued interest for the contribution, she has a financial incentive to make the loan 
despite the consequences for the company’s creditors. 
 Shift now from the artificial numerical example to the real world of financially troubled 
companies (particularly the small- and medium-sized businesses that figure in many of the 
recharacterization cases). Will troubled firms often have business projects that fit the profile 
of the project described above? The answer is almost certainly yes. For many troubled 
businesses, continuing the business for another month or year, rather than shutting down 
today, is, in effect, a net negative present value project. Injecting additional cash may simply 
prolong the inevitable demise, using up assets whose value might otherwise have gone to 
creditors. In theory, creditors could take matters into their own hands under these 
circumstances and throw the company into bankruptcy involuntarily. But the shareholder loan 
may itself prevent creditors from filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition. To sustain an 
involuntary petition, creditors must show that the debtor is not paying its debts as they come 
due.28 If the loan enables the company to pay its current creditors for a few more months, the 
creditors will not be able to make this showing. 
                                                 
26  As hopefully is clear, both concerns can be implicated by the same shareholder loan. But it is 
essential to keep the analysis separate. 
27  Clark, loc. cit. n. 1, at pp. 512-513. 
28  11 USC §303(h). 
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 If every shareholder loan fit this pattern – good money, badly spent – a simple prohibition 
of shareholder loans would be in order. But sometimes shareholder loans make both creditors 
and the company better rather than worse off. If there is a 50 percent probability the project 
described above will return $15, for instance, and a 50 percent probability of $7, the $10 
investment suddenly has a present value of $11 and is worth pursuing. In a world where 
shareholder loans may destroy value that would otherwise go to creditors, but may also fund 
valuable projects, how should courts respond to a request that a shareholder loan be 
recharacterized or subordinated? 
 An elegant new article that carefully explores the effects of recharacterizing shareholder 
loans both when a company is solvent and when it is insolvent concludes that courts should 
assess the quality of the project that the loan was used to finance. “A shareholder loan would 
fail the test,” on this view, and should thus be treated as equity “when the accepted value of 
total assets after a rescue attempt results in a reduction” in the value of the company’s assets. 
“If an increase in the going concern value after the rescue was to be expected, the 
shareholder-creditor should be treated like a third-party creditor in bankruptcy.”29 The beauty 
of this approach is that it neatly distinguishes between shareholder loans that benefit the 
company and those that impair creditors’ recoveries by inappropriately postponing the 
company’s bankruptcy. The obvious problem is that courts (and the experts whose testimony 
would inform a court’s decision) are not well positioned to make these calculations. In 
addition to the complexities of the basic analysis, the scrutiny would be prone to the kinds of 
hindsight bias that make courts reluctant to inquire into business judgments in other contexts. 
 Before we can offer any conclusions about the ill-founded loan problem, we need to add 
one more essential variable. The analysis thus far has assumed that the shareholder is lending 
to the company on an unsecured basis. But a substantial proportion of shareholder loans are 
made on a secured basis. In these cases, the question is not simply whether shareholder loans 
should be honored and thus encouraged. There is the added issue of whether the shareholder 
should be permitted to claim priority for the loan. 
 Once again, we should begin by asking whether these loans inappropriately hinder 
creditors. The basic trade-off is the same: as with unsecured loans, secured lending can be 
used to finance projects with either a net positive or a net negative value. But the stakes are in 
a sense higher with secured lending. Because the promise of collateral leapfrogs the secured 
lender ahead of other creditors, giving her the equivalent of a seat in first class, lenders may 
be willing to provide credit on a secured basis even if the financing will be used for projects 
whose value is much less than their cost. Yet the prospect of security can also facilitate 
financing for a valuable project that no lender would fund on an unsecured basis, due to the 
fact that the lender’s claim would simply be lumped together with all of the debtor’s other 
obligations. In economic jargon, collateral sometimes leads to overinvestment, but it also can 
be used to solve an underinvestment or debt overhang dilemma.30 
                                                 
29  M. Gelter, The Subordination of Shareholder Loans in Bankruptcy, John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Fellows’ Discussion Paper No. 4 (January 2005) 
p. 32. Gelter’s analysis suggests that, if the company is insolvent, recharacterization will never 
preclude an efficient investment and will discourage some but not all inefficient investments. If the 
company is insolvent, recharacterization will have a wide variety of effects, some beneficial and 
some harmful, depending on the size of the difference between the expected value of the project 
and the liquidation value of the company’s assets. The analysis considers only uncollateralized 
loans. As will become clear in the text below, secured loans are, in our view, the most important 
and worrisome form of lending by shareholders. 
30  The classic analysis is Stewart C. Myers, ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, 5 Journal of 
Financial Economics (1977) p. 147. Over- and underinvestment analysis is applied to debtor-in-
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 The implications of over- and underinvestment are initially quite counterintuitive. One 
might think that secured loans should always be discouraged if a company is insolvent. In 
reality, however, the more deeply insolvent a company is, the more serious the 
underinvestment problem will be; absent security, lenders will not finance even gold-plated 
projects if the debtor is drowning in debt.31 The state of the company’s solvency is thus a 
very imperfect measure of whether a secured loan should be applauded or condemned.32 
 If a shareholder’s decision whether to lend money to her company were generally based on 
an objective assessment of the prospects for the investment, courts could simply honor both 
the loan and the shareholder’s priority treatment. But shareholder decision making is 
anything but objective as a company sinks into financial distress. To be sure, shareholder-
managers know the business better than anyone else. But they tend to view its prospects 
through the rosiest of glasses. They also have a huge human capital investment in the 
company. The shareholder’s decision to make a loan therefore may be anything but objective. 
 Another set of concerns arises once the loan has been made, and applies even to loans that 
are not infected by the distortions we have just described. Because the shareholder who 
makes the loan is also likely to be managing the business itself, there is a risk that she will 
take steps that increase the amount of collateral subject to her security interest to the 
detriment of other creditors. The shareholder can build up the company’s inventory, for 
instance, if the security interest includes inventory. This general pattern of behavior is 
common enough to have a name: it is known as “feeding the lien.” 
 One can imagine using either of two approaches to address these concerns, an ad hoc 
approach or a per se rule. Under a particularized, ad hoc approach, courts might look for 
evidence that the shareholder had in fact taken steps to feed her lien, and disallow the security 
interest only if evidence of manipulation could be found. But manipulation not only may be 
difficult to detect: it also is only a small part of the problem of secured shareholder loans. 
More serious and pervasive is the risk that the secured shareholder loan will prolong the 
travails of a troubled company at the expense of its creditors. Lending on a collateralized 
basis enables a shareholder to have her cake and eat it too: to keep the hope of a turnaround 
alive, while using a security interest to limit her exposure under the new loan. The risk that 
this will simply delay the failure of an unviable company, and that value will be destroyed in 
the interim, is so high, in our view, that it calls for a per se response: courts should 
automatically disallow the shareholder’s security interest and treat the loan as a general, 
unsecured claim. 
 One obvious objection is that at least a few of these loans may be justified. If the company 
is drowning in debt, but has a valuable business opportunity, a rational shareholder might be 
reluctant to lend unless she were given priority, since the value of any new, unsecured loan 
would be diluted by the other competing claims against the debtor’s assets. This is simply 
another way of saying that collateral may be necessary to solve an underinvestment (or debt 
overhang) problem. But this objection is not especially persuasive on inspection. If the 
company, unlike most in these circumstances, has a valuable prospect but needs to borrow on 
a collateralized basis to pursue it, the company still could look to an outside creditor for the 
loan. Moreover, if the company does find itself in bankruptcy, the generous provisions for 
post-petition financing make it likely that a company which truly does have good future 
                                                 
possession financing in bankruptcy in G.G. Triantis, ‘A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing’, 46 Vanderbilt Law Review (1993) p. 901. 
31  See, e.g., Triantis, loc. cit. n. 30, at p. 920. 
32  Indeed, to the extent one focused entirely on the company’s solvency or insolvency, it would make 
more sense to subordinate any loan made while the company was solvent and to honor loans made 
after it sinks into insolvency. 
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prospects will be able to obtain financing – and the financing arrangement will be overseen 
by a truly objective decision maker: the bankruptcy judge.33 
 A second objection arises from precisely the opposite intuition to the first. To the extent 
one is persuaded (as we are) that eve-of-insolvency secured loans are more likely to lead to 
overinvestment than to counteract underinvestment, one might go still further and subordinate 
even those secured loans that are made by a third party if they are made when the company is 
in financial trouble.34 In our view, this view has much more to recommend it than is usually 
assumed, but we would be reluctant to extend the per se subordination this far. One reason to 
distinguish third-party loans from shareholder loans is that third parties are less likely to be in 
a position to “feed the lien” or otherwise manipulate the company’s affairs to protect the new 
secured loan at the expense of other creditors. In addition, when a shareholder lends money to 
the company, she is preserving the “option value” of her equity interest in the company. The 
loan is in a very real sense designed to keep her interest as a shareholder of the company 
alive. Loans by a third-party lender are not subject to the same conflict and are somewhat less 
worrisome as a result. 
 Each of these explanations is only partial at best, however. There still remains the nagging 
suspicion that secured loans to financially troubled companies will often simply prolong the 
inevitable demise. A more compelling explanation comes from the perspective third-party 
lenders generally bring to their decision whether to lend to a troubled company. If these 
lenders simply focused on the loan in question, eve-of-bankruptcy secured loans by a third 
party might often lead to overinvestment. But lenders generally are not focusing simply on 
their initial loan. They are more likely to view the loan as the first step toward an ongoing 
lending relationship with the debtor. As a result, lenders are much more likely to lend to a 
company they expect to survive, than to make the last loan to a company that is on its way 
down.35 This does not suggest there is no reason to worry about third-party secured loans to a 
troubled company. But it does suggest that these loans are far less troublesome than loans by 
a shareholder. 
 If secured loans by the shareholders of troubled companies are worrisome, some might be 
inclined to go even further than we have suggested, and disallow even unsecured shareholder 
loans. Under this view, every loan by a shareholder would be subordinated to all other 
creditors or recharacterized as equity in order to address the overinvestment concerns we 
have discussed. Although we believe that this position has much to recommend it, we are not 
inclined to go quite so far. In part, our reluctance stems from the fact that the shareholder 
cannot manipulate an unsecured loan quite so easily as a secured loan. If the shareholder 
induces the company to repay her rather than other creditors on the eve of bankruptcy, for 
instance, the trustee may be able to invoke bankruptcy’s prohibition of preferential payments 
as a basis for retrieving the payments.36 In addition, shareholders may sometimes be a better 
source of loans than a third party, because the shareholder loan saves the transaction costs of 
                                                 
33  DIP financing is authorized by 11 USC §364. For a brief history of DIP financing, and an analysis 
of its use in recent cases, see D.A. Skeel, Jr., ‘The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing’, 25 Cardozo Law Review (2004) p. 1905. See also D.G. Baird and R.K. 
Rasmussen, ‘Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance’, 154 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (2006, forthcoming) (exploring lender governance both before and in 
bankruptcy). 
34  Although he has not explicitly endorsed this view, Barry Adler has hinted at such a position. See, 
e.g., B.E. Adler, ‘A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives’, 62 University of 
Chicago Law Review (1995) p. 575 at p. 605. 
35  See, for example, Skeel, loc. cit. n. 33, at pp. 1924-1925 (discussing the importance of ongoing 
lending relationships in the debtor-in-possession financing context). 
36  11 USC §547. 
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finding and negotiating with a third-party lender. We should acknowledge that we remain less 
than entirely convinced by these arguments against full subordination of shareholder 
lending.37 But the more pressing concern is that shareholders not be entitled to claim a 
secured status for loans they make to the company. 
 Thus far, we have assumed that the shareholder was a shareholder before she lent money 
to the company. In the United States, this will generally be an accurate description of the 
chronology. But sometimes, particularly in the European context, an existing creditor 
acquires equity. How should this situation be treated? In our view, the acquisition of an 
equity interest by an existing creditor is less problematic than a shareholder loan, because it is 
less likely to have a dilutive effect on the interests of current creditors. We would make one 
major exception, however: if the creditor acquires a controlling equity stake in the company, 
the risk that the creditor will use its control to favor its own interests arises, just as with a 
secured shareholder loan.38 Under these circumstances, we would therefore apply the same 
principles as with a shareholder loan. At the very least, the secured portion should be 
disallowed. 
 Let us pause here to briefly consider an apparent tension between our starting point – a 
consideration of the moral obligations of debtors to their creditors – and the conclusions we 
have reached, which do not seem as obviously based on general moral intuitions. Indeed, the 
moral arguments might seem to suggest that shareholder loans, whether secured or not, 
should be applauded. A shareholder whose business is failing will naturally attempt to save it, 
the reasoning goes, and these rescue efforts should be praised rather than skeptically 
scrutinized. Notice, however, that this argument does not explain why shareholders should be 
permitted to lend on a collateralized basis. After all, security lets them have their cake and eat 
it too: leading a rescue effort without taking the risk of failure. Similarly but more 
importantly, our initial intuition that shareholders should be applauded for contributing to a 
rescue needs to be adjusted to consider the likelihood that the “rescue” will often destroy 
value and hinder creditors’ ability to collect what they are owed. 
 UK company law is a useful comparison here. When a UK company encounters financial 
distress, its directors are expected to accede to insolvency proceedings rather than continuing 
business as usual in the hope of digging out of the company’s hole. Under the United 
Kingdom’s “wrongful trading” rules, directors who violate this expectation are subject to a 
wide range of sanctions, including personal liability and the possibility of a fifteen-year 
prohibition from serving as a director at another company.39 The wrongful trading rule 
                                                 
37  As we discuss in more detail in Part 4.2.2, another argument sometimes advanced in favor of 
shareholder loans is that the loans counteract shareholders’ incentives to take excessive risks in 
order to preserve their stake in the company.  This argument seems plausible to us with unsecured 
shareholder loans but much less so with a secured loan, since the secured loan may be protected 
against loss even when the shareholder gambles unsuccessfully with the company’s assets.  Like 
us, Clark is agnostic about the question whether unsecured shareholder loans should automatically 
be subordinated. Clark, op. cit. n. 1, at pp. 538-539. Clark does not address the issue of secured 
shareholder loans. 
38  Interestingly, Germany provides an exception to its equity substitution rules that can be seen as 
addressing the issue described in the text. This provision, §32a III 2 GmbHG, reads: “These rules 
[on equity substitution] do not apply to a non-managing shareholder whose equity share does not 
exceed 10 percent.” §32a III 3 GmbHG then adds: “If a creditor acquires equity in a crisis of the 
company in order to overcome this crisis, this does not lead to the application of the equity 
substitution laws on his existing or new loans.” As the discussion in the text suggests, this second 
exception is more problematic in the event the creditor acquires a controlling stake. 
39  The wrongful trading rule is described in J. Armour, B. Cheffins and D. Skeel, ‘Corporate 
Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’, 
55 Vanderbilt Law Review (2002) p. 1699 at pp. 1746-1747. 
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reflects an assumption that directors who carry on with ordinary trading after the company 
begins to hemorrhage cash are hindering their shareholders and creditors. US corporate law 
takes a more optimistic view of the prospects for recovery and generally does not punish 
directors who try to postpone the day of reckoning.40 But with shareholder loans, a context 
where the risk of undermining creditor recoveries is both systematic and high, the moral 
assumption that secured loans will have the effect of hindering creditors is fully warranted. 
To put the point slightly differently, a transaction transferring a security interest to one of the 
company’s shareholders is more like a fraudulent conveyance than an ordinary loan. 
 
3.4 Applying the analysis: the eleven-factor Autostyle Plastics test 
 
The previous two sections have argued that two different kinds of concerns may be 
implicated when shareholders make a loan to their own company. With ambiguous loans, 
courts should focus on whether the existence of the loan would be clear to an inquiring 
creditor. If not, and if the loan thus violates the ideal of Truth, it should be treated as a 
contribution to equity rather than as debt. Whether or not a loan is ambiguous, it also may 
hinder the company’s creditors, dissipating value as the company’s shareholders attempt to 
postpone liquidation. Here, the more general concern of Nonhindrance takes center stage. We 
have argued that this second concern should be addressed by invalidating any security 
interest that purports to secure the shareholder loan. As a doctrinal matter, courts would need 
to use equitable subordination rather than recharacterization as the basis for disallowing a 
shareholder’s security interest on Nonhindrance grounds, since our analysis does not call for 
recharacterizing the secured loan as equity. Rather, it would be treated as an ordinary 
unsecured claim. 
 Recent judicial opinions addressing the recharacterization issue have conflated the Truth 
and Nonhindrance concerns and also have been overly influenced by the seemingly similar 
tax recharacterization doctrine, which, as we have seen, is aimed at a very different problem. 
The case law that has resulted is, to put it charitably, muddled. As a result, we will argue, 
courts have been too willing to honor shareholder loans according to their terms. To see this, 
consider the eleven-factor test laid out in the leading recharacterization case. According to the 
Sixth Circuit, courts should consider each of the following factors: 
 
(1) the names given to the instruments; 
(2) presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and payment schedule; 
(3) presence or absence of fixed interest payments; 
(4) source of repayments; 
(5) adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; 
(6) identity of interest (or not) between the creditor and shareholder; 
(7) security (or not) for the advances; 
(8) the corporation’s ability to obtain financing from outside lenders; 
(9) the extent to which the advances were subordinated to other creditors; 
(10) the extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets; and 
(11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide repayment.41 
 
Notice the variety of different concerns that seem to be proxied by the eleven factors. The 
first three factors focus squarely on the ambiguous loan issue. “The absence of notes or other 
                                                 
40  For an argument that it should, see A.M. Dickerson, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing 
Corporate Failures, 38 Wake Forest Law Review (2003) p. 101. 
41  In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at p. 750. 
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instruments of indebtedness,” as the Autostyle Plastics court put it, “is a strong indication that 
the advances were capital contributions and not loans.”42 The fifth and eighth factors offer 
related but independent standards for assessing whether a cash infusion should be seen as a 
loan (both of which, as we shall see, are standards that are used in Germany and Austria). If a 
company is undercapitalized, the fifth factor implies, new cash should be viewed as 
addressing the need for capital rather than as a loan. Under the eighth factor, the intuition is 
that shareholder financing should not be treated as a loan if no one else would make a similar 
loan on these terms. Most of the remaining factors deal with the Nonhindrance issue in one 
way or another, but in a fashion that is clearly influenced by tax recharacterization doctrine. 
Factors 7 (whether the shareholder has insisted on security), 9 (whether the obligation is 
subordinated) and 11 (whether the obligation has a dedicated source of repayment) can each 
be seen as influenced by the tax concern that shareholders will create a low priority debt 
security, rather than a class of stock, in order to take advantage of the deductibility of debt. 
Each of these factors overlaps with the Nonhindrance analysis.43 Factor 10 then addresses 
Nonhindrance directly, asking whether the funds will be used to acquire capital assets or to 
finance operations. 
 There are two intactible problems with this welter of factors. The first is that many are 
either unhelpful or used in precisely the wrong way. Second, the overall list has tended to 
distort courts’ analysis of what should and should not be honored as a loan. 
 The emphasis on undercapitalization falls into the unhelpful category. As noted earlier and 
discussed again in the next part, a company’s financial condition is not always a good 
barometer of whether a loan is justified: if the project is a good one, the loan should be 
encouraged even if the company is heavily indebted. Moreover, the emphasis on 
undercapitalization conflates the recharacterization question with the analytically distinct 
issue of whether the corporate veil should be pierced and the company’s shareholders held 
personally responsible for its obligations. Creditworthiness is a more defensible standard, but 
it too is flawed, since it may be difficult to determine whether an outside creditor would make 
a loan, and this willingness is itself an imperfect proxy for whether a loan would enhance or 
destroy value.44 
 Particularly misguided is the tenth factor (whether the advances were used to acquire 
capital assets). “Use of advances to meet the daily operating needs of the corporation,” 
according to the Autostyle Plastics court,” rather than to purchase capital assets, is indicative 
of bona fide indebtedness.”45 Although it seems sensible at first glance (at least to those who 
snoozed through the discussion in the last section), this distinction is very hard to defend; if 
anything, it gets the likely effect of a cash infusion exactly backwards. Pumping more money 
into the operations of a troubled firm will often simply prolong its deterioration – recall that 
unwarranted continuation is the most frequent form of “overinvestment” – whereas the 
acquisition a capital asset may (though, to be sure, it also may not) be tied to a profitable new 
business opportunity. Similarly, the factors that seem indebted to tax law privilege secured 
lending. Secured loans, as we have seen, are precisely the loans that pose the greatest danger 
of overinvestment, particularly when the lender is a shareholder rather than a third party. 
 What do courts do with all of this? Faced with a welter of factors, they seem to focus 
heavily on whether the infusion looks like a “proper” loan. If the loan is carefully 
                                                 
42  Ibid. 
43  Unfortunately, however, as discussed below, tax recharacterization doctrine has led courts to apply 
these factors in almost exactly the wrong way in bankruptcy. 
44  See, e.g., Gelter, op. cit. n. 29, at pp. 27-30 (noting that a hypothetical lender would base her loan 
decision on her prospects of repayment under the terms of the loan, rather than on whether the loan 
is value enhancing for the debtor). 
45  In re Autostyle Plastics, 269 F.3d at p. 752. 
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documented, courts are loath to interfere. This stance makes perfect sense for addressing the 
ambiguous loan issue. It also can be seen as linking the ambiguous loan factors with the 
factors that show a preference for secured loans, since the security interest will generally be 
reflected in a public filing. But the ideal of Nonhindrance seems to get lost in the enthusiasm 
for form and security. As a result, properly documented secured loans are almost always 
upheld, as in the Autostyle Plastics case itself. Yet these are precisely the loans that pose the 
greatest risk of overinvestment and of manipulation by the shareholder-manager. While clear 
documentation addresses the ambiguous loan problem, the Nonhindrance ideal suggests that 
the security interests should be subordinated and the loans treated as general unsecured 
obligations. 
 
4. The German and Austrian alternatives: creditworthiness and 
undercapitalization 
 
4.1 Overview of the rules 
 
The German doctrine on equity substitution law (Eigenkapitalersatzrecht) has its roots in the 
same era that saw the emergence of equitable subordination in the United States. In the late 
1930s, the German Imperial Court (Reichsgericht) decided the first German cases on equity 
substitution.46 In the first case, the Reichsgericht viewed its decision as an individual 
correction of a special case of misconduct; but by the second case it had already established a 
more general rule regarding the subordination of shareholder loans.47 With its Lufttaxi 
decision in 1959,48 the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) adopted this case 
law and developed the doctrine over the years. 
The doctrinal justifications for the equity substitution rules have both changed and 
accumulated in the fifty years since the original cases. Among the stated rationales are: that 
companies should issue equity instead of debt in times of crisis; that it is inappropriate for the 
company to put the financing risk solely on outside creditors; that shareholder-lenders have 
informational advantages that could operate to the detriment of other creditors; that the 
shareholders should not be permitted to speculate at the expense of other creditors; and that 
shareholder loans may create a misleading perception that the company is adequately 
capitalized.49 In its BuM/WestLB decision, the BGH made it clear that it considers all of these 
concerns the basis for its doctrine, and the Court consolidated them into the term 
“responsibility for consequences of corporate finance.”50 The current doctrinal justification 
has been criticized,51 but seems to be firmly established in the BGH’s decisions since 
                                                 
46  RG JW 1938, 862; 1939, 355. 
47  B. Gehde, Eigenkapitalersetzende Gesellschafterleistungen in Deutschland und den USA [Equity 
Substituting Contributions by Shareholders in Germany and the United States] (Berlin, Duncker & 
Humblot 1997) p. 54. 
48  BGHZ 76, 326. 
49  H. von Gerkan and P. Hommelhoff, Handbuch des Kapitalersatzrechts [Handbook of Equity 
Substitution Law], 2nd edn. (Cologne, RWS 2002) p. 30; T. Bezzenberger, ‘Kapitalersetzende 
Gesellschafterdarlehen im Recht der GmbH’ [Equity Substituting Shareholder Loans in the Law 
Regarding the GmbH], in H.-P. Westermann and K. Mock, eds., Festschrift für Gerold 
Bezzenberger zum 70. Geburtstag [Festschrift for Gerold Bezzenberger for his 70th Birthday] 
(Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 2000) p. 23 at pp. 28-29. 
50  ‘Finanzierungsfolgenverantwortung’, BGHZ 90, 381, 388. 
51  See, e.g., Bezzenberger, loc. cit. n. 49, at pp. 34-35; B. Grunewald, ‘Plädoyer für eine Abschaffung 
der Rechtsregeln für eigenkapitalersetzende Gesellschafterdarlehen’ [Plea for the Abolition of the 
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BuM/WestLB.52 Legal scholars have added additional justifications for the doctrine, including 
the concern that shareholder loans circumvent the oversight of the financial markets53 and 
that they create a risk of overinvestment.54 
As in the United States, a rule calling for the subordination of all shareholder loans might 
seem like the best response to these concerns. Indeed, one of the Reichsgericht’s initial 
decisions seemed to endorse such a per se rule.55 But, even more than in the United States, 
shareholder loans have long been an essential source of finance for small- and medium-sized 
German companies.56 It is of course possible that companies would begin to rely more on 
outside financing, and that outside lenders might step into the vacuum, if shareholder loans 
were automatically subordinated. But given the lower transaction costs of a shareholder loan, 
and the potential frictions that might interfere with efforts to obtain third party loans, we are 
hesitant to endorse a blanket rule that would subordinate all shareholder loans. As in the 
United States, we need a criterion that differentiates between those shareholder loans that 
should be subordinated and those that should stand as loans, as we discuss in more detail in 
the next section. 
The German rules only subordinate shareholder loans which are deemed to “substitute 
equity.”57 The criterion used to determine an equity substitution is whether the company’s 
circumstances were such that a reasonable shareholder would make an equity contribution 
(§32a GmbHG defines such a situation as a “crisis of the company”). In order to clarify this 
standard, the criterion of creditworthiness is applied. The creditworthiness test asks whether a 
reasonable outsider would have given the same loan under the same conditions.58 If the 
answer is no, the shareholder loan is deemed an equity substitute. 
The Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) adopted the German rules in a case 
decided in 1991.59 In 2003, the Austrian Parliament codified these rules as well.60 The main 
difference between the Austrian doctrine that has emerged, as compared to its German 
counterpart, is that the Austrian rules focus more on undercapitalization and less on 
creditworthiness. 
 
4.2 Critique of the German criteria 
 
The German creditworthiness standard has the virtue of drawing a clear, intuitively attractive 
line between shareholder loans that are permissible and those considered a threat to the 
company’s other creditors. Its aim is to maintain a company’s minimum capitalization and 
thereby to protect the company’s other creditors. Although making a hypothetical, after-the-
fact assessment of whether a third party would have made the loan in question may be 
                                                 
Legal Rules Regarding Equity Substituting Shareholder Loans], 88 GmbH Rundschau (1997) pp. 
7-10. 
52  BGHZ 90, 381, 389; BGHZ 105, 168, 175; BGHZ 127, 336, 346. 
53  Bezzenberger, loc. cit. n. 49, at p. 36. 
54  E. Renger, Gläubigerschutz durch §32a GmbHG [Creditor Protection by means of §32a GmbHG] 
(Frankfurt, Peter Lang 2004) p. 69. 
55  RG JW 1939, 355, 356: “The Court treats these alleged loans as what they really are: equity.” 
56  Von Gerkan and Hommelhoff, op. cit. n. 49, at pp. 21-22. 
57  BGHZ 76, 330; M. Lutter, P. Hommelhoff, et al., eds., GmbH-Gesetz (Cologne, Otto Schmidt 
2004) at §32a/b, Rn. 18. 
58  BGH WM 1972, 75; BGHZ 81, 262-263; BGH ZIP (Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht) 1990, 99-100. 
59  OGH 8 May 1991, 8 Ob 9/91, SZ 64/53. 
60  Bundesgesetz über Eigenkapital ersetzende Gesellschafterleistungen, Art. I Gesellschafts- und 
Insolvenzrechtsänderungsgesetz [Federal Law Regarding Equity Substituting Shareholder 
Contributions] 2003 – GIRÄG 2003, BGBl. I 2003/92. 
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difficult, there is now an extensive body of case law to guide the inquiry.61 The problem with 
this standard is not so much with its difficulty in application, but with the focus on 
creditworthiness itself. It does not identify the proper claims for subordination. As we shall 
see, the weakness of the test is especially evident in the case of secured shareholder loans. 
 
4.2.1 Inefficient results 
 
The most obvious problem with the creditworthiness standard is that it leads to inefficient 
results.62 A hypothetical outside lender does not base her decision whether to extend a loan or 
not on efficiency concerns, but rather solely on the basis of her own chance of recovery.63 
Her individual benefits, however, might not coincide with the best result for society as a 
whole, or even for other creditors of the company. As discussed earlier, the key question for 
many of the companies that rely on shareholder loans is whether keeping the company afloat 
is cost-justified, or whether it is more likely simply to delay an inevitable failure and destroy 
value in the process. Ideally, the court might address this question directly and subordinate 
loans that have a net negative present value.64 But, as noted earlier, courts are not well 
positioned to make this kind of determination. 
 
4.2.2 Inability to properly deal with secured shareholder loans 
 
The shortcomings of the creditworthiness standard are particularly evident when it comes to 
secured shareholder loans. As with recharacterization doctrine in the United States, the 
German creditworthiness standard treats secured shareholder loans as less worrisome than 
unsecured loans.65 The problem with this, as we have seen, is that the risk of overinvestment 
– of postponing default and diverting value from creditors as a result – is particularly high if 
the shareholder is able to lend on a secured basis. 
In addition, because the loan is made by an insider-shareholder rather than a third party, 
the benefits that justify secured loans in other contexts are much less likely to be in evidence. 
Shareholder-lenders cannot be expected to monitor the debtor and its managers, for instance, 
if they themselves are the managers.66 
                                                 
61  For opposing arguments on the difficulty of assessing creditworthiness, see, for example, A. 
Goetz, Juristische und ökonomische Analyse des Eigenkapitalersatzrechts [Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Equity Substitution Law] (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2001) p. 43 (difficult to apply); 
and Gehde, op. cit. n. 47, at p. 94 (fairly simple to apply). 
  While creditworthiness is the key criterion, German courts also look at capitalization to 
determine equity substitution. Lutter and Hommelhoff, op. cit. n. 57, at §32a/b, Rn. 33. As noted 
earlier, capitalization is also the main factor in Austrian equity substitution law. The shortcomings 
of the capitalization standard are quite similar to the shortcoming of creditworthiness discussed 
below. Most importantly, adequacy of capitalization is a poor proxy for whether a proposed loan 
should be encouraged or discouraged. 
62  Gelter, op. cit. n. 29, at pp. 27-30. 
63  Ibid., at p. 29. 
64  Ibid., at p. 28. 
65  “If the company gives a security from its own assets, which an outside creditor would have 
required, considered sufficient in the moment of issuing the loan and actually received, it is a 
factor against the qualification as equity substitution, unless special circumstances require a 
different judgment.” BGH ZIP 1999, 1524, 1526; BGH ZIP 2001, 839-840. 
66  The role of secured credit as a mechanism for reducing agency costs is explored in detail in 
Renger, op. cit. n. 54, at pp. 96-98. 
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In the German context, shareholder loans are often defended as helping to align the 
shareholder-managers’ incentives with interests of the company’s outside creditors.67 
Shareholders have incentives to engage in risks, the argument goes, since they are the ones 
who benefit from positive results, while being able to share the consequences of negative 
results with the creditors. The more highly leveraged the company is, the greater the 
shareholders’ incentives to take risks at the expense of their creditors. The conflict in 
incentives is reduced, however, if the shareholder lends money to the company and thus also 
acts as a creditor.68 Indeed, the shareholder may become affirmatively risk averse if her debt 
interest is sufficiently large.69 
While this alignment-of-incentives defense of shareholder loans is at least plausible if the 
shareholder lends on an unsecured basis, it loses nearly all of its force if the loan is secured.70 
The shareholder/secured creditor does not bear the risk of default on her loan due to the 
security, but still receives the profits if the company succeeds. As a result, the security 
enables the shareholder to have her cake and eat it too. If anything, a secured loan may 
exacerbate the conflict between the shareholder’s incentives and the interests of the outside 
creditors and the company as a whole. It does not remove the shareholder’s incentive to take 
risks, and at the same time facilitates the financing that may make the risk taking possible. 
In short, the creditworthiness standard is particularly difficult to defend as applied to 
secured shareholder loans.71 The threat posed by secured shareholder loans is even graver in 
Germany than in the United States because of differences in the respective insolvency 
regimes. The manager-displacing quality of German insolvency law creates even stronger 
incentives for overinvestment, that is, investments in a company that is not worth 
continuing.72 Because a managing shareholder knows that she will lose control of her 
company in the case of insolvency, she will try even harder to save it. A secured shareholder 
loan presents a relatively safe platform for a rescue attempt. This safety is gained at the 
expense of the unsecured creditors, however, as it creates the incentive to engage in 
enormous risks.73 
Given the threats posed by secured shareholder loans and their comparative lack of 
benefits for anyone other than the shareholder herself, a per se standard of subordination 
seems to us the most defensible strategy. Such a standard would greatly discourage secured 
                                                 
67  A. Engert, ‘Die ökonomische Begründung der Grundsätze ordnungsgemäßer 
Unternehmensfinanzierung’ [The Economic Grounds for the Principles of Proper Company 
Financing], 33 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (2004) p. 813 at p. 820 et seq. 
68  Bezzenberger, loc. cit. n. 49, at p. 38. 
69  Engert, loc. cit. n. 67, at p. 825, Goetz, op. cit. n. 61, at p. 167 et seq. 
70  Engert, loc. cit. n. 67, at p. 831. 
71  Also proposing the prohibition of secured shareholder loans in principle: A. Cahn, 
‘Gesellschafterfremdfinanzierung und Eigenkapitalersatz’ [Outsider Financing by Shareholders 
and Equity Substitution], 50 Die Aktiengesellschaft (2005) p. 217 at p. 225. 
72  The differential treatment of managers in the insolvency laws of the United States (where existing 
managers continue to run the company as “debtor in possession”) and Germany (which provides 
for prompt removal of the managers) is briefly described in D.A. Skeel, Jr., ‘An Evolutionary 
Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review (1998) p. 1325. 
It is also more difficult to secure post-petition financing in German insolvency proceedings. See U. 
Noack, ‘Neues Insolvenzrecht – neues Kapitalersatzrecht?’ [New Insolvency Law – New Equity 
Substitution Law?], in K.-P. Martens, et al., eds., Festschrift für Carsten Peter Claussen 
[Festschrift for Carsten Peter Claussen] (Cologne, Carl Heymans Verlag 1997) p. 307 at p. 316. 
73  We are focusing principally on loans made by an existing shareholder. As noted earlier, we are 
inclined to subordinate the security interest of a creditor that later acquires equity only if the 
creditor acquires a large or controlling stake.  
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shareholder loans. At the same time, it would not interfere with the extension of unsecured 
shareholder loans and thereby would keep this measure of corporate finance relatively intact. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Both in the United States and in Germany, lawmakers and courts have long wrestled with the 
issue of whether to accord shareholder loans the same status as the loans made by outsiders. 
This article has suggested that courts have been right to worry about the potential effects of 
loans by shareholders to companies that later prove unable to pay their debts, but that their 
focus is misplaced in crucial respects. Using Robert Clark’s typology of a debtor’s moral 
obligations to its creditors as a starting point, we have considered whether and when 
shareholder loans should be subordinated or recharacterized as equity. Our most important 
conclusion is that secured shareholder loans so often and so thoroughly violate the obligation 
of Nonhindrance of creditors that they should always be subordinated. 
 One question the article has not yet addressed is why creditors do not seem to limit 
shareholder loans by contract.  Creditors could use negative pledge clauses, for instance, to 
explicitly prevent some or all shareholder loans.  We suspect one reason for the dearth of 
such clauses may be that it is difficult to distinguish good shareholder loans from bad ones—
though, as we have argued, it seems likely that secured shareholder loans are rarely both good 
and necessary.  Transaction costs may also discourage many creditors from addressing the 
risk of a value destroying shareholder loan by contract.  It may also be the case that existing, 
general negative pledge clauses would in fact preclude shareholder loans in many instances.  
Whatever the explanation, our analysis suggests that, at least in the absence of an explicit 
agreement by creditors to give priority to a secured shareholder loan, secured shareholder 
loans should be subordinated. 
